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INTRODUCTION
Historically, energy has been a heavily regulated industry.' The
rationale behind this history of tight control has been primarily an
economic one2 based on the beliefs that electric utilities are natural
monopolies3 and that forcing competition will disrupt the utilities'
economies of scale. 4 This long-standing belief has evolved over the

I. See, e.g., Harvey Wasserman, Utility Deregulation in Turmoil, ENN
FEATURES (June 3, 1998) <http://wwv.enn.com/features/1 998/06/060398/0603fea.
asp> (highlighting that the advent of electricity in the United States was dominated
by a few large firms, which resulted in price manipulation). For sixty years following President Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, under which utilities were
given monopoly territories in exchange for the regulation of their profits, state
utility commissions established returns at approximately fifteen percent. See id.

2. See, e.g., id. (claiming President Roosevelt's reason for initially regulating
profits of electric utilities was that the monopolistic structure of the industry resulted in price manipulation and unreliable service).
3. See ROGER A. MORIN, UTILITIES' COST OF CAPITAL 3 (1984) (suggesting
that the belief behind the natural monopoly structure of public utilities stemmed
from the fact that the industry required a high cost of capital to build plant facilities
and distribution networks and that it was inefficient to duplicate such costs, thus
creating a barrier to entry into the industry).
4. See M. Bruce Harper, Trust But Verify: Innovation in Compliance Monitoring as a Response to the Privatization of Utilities in Developed Nations, 48
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past several years as governments of developed nations around the
world have explored the possibility of deregulation or privatization
industries.! The impetus behind this new trend is also
of their energy
-6
economic. Recently introduced competition and the reduction of
governmental control7 in the energy industry have brought about increased productivity and decreased energy prices.'
ADMIN. L. REv. 593, 599-605 (1996) (stating that low cost power is imperative to
national economic well-being in terms of economic growth and security; thus there
was a belief that the industry required tight regulation to correct market flaws present in naturally monopolistic industries while limiting market entry to prevent an
inefficient duplication of start-up cost of capital).
5. See id. at 593 (discussing the transformation of the energy industry from
intensive regulation to the current trend of deregulation). Many European countries
are in the process of deregulating their electricity industries. See. e.g., Communiny
Law: Delays in Transposition of Energy Legislation, EUR. ENERGY (Europe Information Service), July 25, 1997, at No. 496 (indicating that Italy is slow in implementing European Union energy law); Electricity: Deadlines For Opening Up EU
Market Are Not Too Tight, Says Papoutsis, EUR. ENERGY (Europe Information
Service), Mar. 20, 1998, at No. 510 (answering the concerns of Greece over strict
deadlines for implementation of the Electricity Directive's mandates); Electricit.y:
Gennan and British Markets Are at Least Being Prised Open, EUR. ENERGY
(Europe Information Service), May 8, 1998, at No. 513 (reporting that Germany's
deregulation efforts are even more far-reaching than required by the Electricity Directive); Electricity: Varying Effects of Deregulation in Nordic Countries, EUR.
ENERGY (Europe Information Service), July 11, 1997, at No. 495 (referring to
Sweden and Finland as having the most liberalized, or least governmentally controlled, energy sectors in Europe while Norway has liberalized its power production without privatizing its industry); Energy Council: Electricity Liberalisation
Debate Grinds on Into 1996, EUR. ENERGY (Europe Information Service), Jan. 12,
1996, at No. 460 (explaining that the Spanish Industry Minister acknowledged the
significance of quickly reaching an agreement on the mandates of the Electricity
Directive but understanding France's concerns that each country be allowed to
adapt the directive's rules under the guidance of that country's practices); see also
The UK Electricity System, infra note 135 (analyzing the varied deregulation efforts of the countries of the United Kingdom).
6. See The Union's Policies-Energy Policy (visited June 3, 1998)
<http://europa.eu.int/pol/ener/enlinfo.htm> (stating that the main economic focal
point of the European Union's energy policy is developing competition).
7. See Harper, supra note 4, at 601-02 (setting forth two methods of reducing
government control). The reduction of governmental control can take one of two
forms: deregulation, removal of protective constraints on the industry, or privatization, transferring ownership of assets from public to private. See id. (discussing
the two solutions to the market's discontent with the poor financial performance of
regulated public utilities).
8. See Dennis C. Stickley, New Forces in InternationalEnergy Law: A Dis-
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Proponents of deregulation assert that the introduction of competition into a previously regulated industry will force companies to innovate in order to lower their costs of producing energy, and will
then pass these benefits along to their customers in the form of lower
prices.9 Deregulation is occurring throughout developed economies"

cussion of Political,Economic, and Environmental Forces within the Current InternationalEnergy Market, I TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 95, 96-101 (1993) (discussing the goals behind energy deregulation and privatization); see also Alexander J. Black, European Law and Public Utility Open Access, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L.
117, 118 (1995) (describing the underlying economic policy goals of deregulation).
9. See Roger Segelken, Electricity Deregulation May Bring Innovation, ENN
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 5, 1997) <http://www.enn.com/enn-news-archive/1997/09/
090597/09059704.asp> (maintaining that current deregulation of power generation
in the United States allows customers to choose the power producer they wish to
utilize and, thus, force companies to innovate in order to remain competitive in the
market). "Competition leads to innovations in very unpredictable ways." Id.
10. See generally Wasserman, supra note 1 (criticizing California's attempts at
deregulation through enactment of bill AB1890, which provided compensation for
a utility's poor investments, such as building nuclear reactors on an earthquake
fault line). This compensation is called a "stranded cost" provision that allows a
utility to collect from its customers a charge for prudently incurred investments,
such as a nuclear reactor purchased to generate power for the benefit of the utility's
customers. See id. (asserting that such large investments as nuclear reactors cause a
utility's rates to be higher, therefore, making the utility less competitive). See, e.g.,
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 27, 38, order
on reh'g, Order No. 888-A, 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37, order on reh'g, Order No. 888B, 81 FERC para. 61,248 (1997), order on reh 'g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC para.
61,046 (1998) [hereinafter Order No. 888 and Order No. 888-A] (establishing the
United States' law implemented by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
FERC law allows stranded cost recovery for those utilities that reasonably incur
costs, which become unprofitable investments, due to the utility's generation customer's use of open-access tariffs, which allow the departing generation customer
to shop for power. FERC has jurisdiction to regulate the utilities' transmission activities and thus, by Order No. 888, order the entities under their jurisdiction to
provide non-discriminatory open-access to their transmission lines. See id. (imposing requirements on transmission utilities to comply with federally mandated
open-access requirements). The United States is also exploring the next step of
electric restructuring that would allow retail customers to select their own power
supplier. See Glen Coplon, Largent, Paxon Drafting Bill as Alternative to Schaefer's, DAILY ELEC. NEWS HIGHLIGHTS, Apr. 6, 1998 (reporting Congressional efforts to establish a mandate that would require all states, since the state has jurisdiction over the retail aspects of energy, to adopt retail choice bills by the year
2002). See, e.g., Final Plan for Restructuring New Hampshire's Electric Utility Industry, New Hampshire Commission Order No. 22,514, Docket No. DR96-150
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and across industries." However, because of the importance of electricity to the economy, both as a service necessary to power businesses and as a service necessary to operate households,'" governments exploring deregulation seem unwilling to cede their regulatory
powers
and vest their complete faith in the workings of the free mar3
ket.'
This Comment focuses on the deregulation and privatization efforts in the electricity industry of the United Kingdom. Specifically,
this Comment addresses the English and Welsh approach to achieve
the economic goals of a deregulated energy industry under the
framework of the Electricity Directive of the European Union. '"Part
I of this paper sets forth the history behind the European Union's efforts to establish a single, cohesive energy policy and the difficulties
it has had thus far in developing such a policy. Part II analyzes the
requirements of the Electricity Directive. Part III examines the prog(prescribing New Hampshire's efforts to create retail choice in their state). Like the
United States, the European Union has, for almost 50 years, attempted to create a
single, transnational market in energy. See Richards Butler, European Union, in
ENERGY AND RESOURCES LAW; A GUIDE To INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
WORLDWIDE 21, 21-24 (Euromoney Publications PLC, 1994) (commenting on the
goals and initiatives of the European Union in establishing a single market in electricity and gas).
11. See Wasserman, supra note 1 (comparing utility deregulation in the United
States to other industries recently deregulated, most notably airlines, trucking, and
telecommunications).
12. See The Union's Policies-Energy Policy, supra note 6 (maintaining that
both economic and social life revolve around the use of energy).
13. See, e.g., Coal Industry: Unions Callfor European Polic, EUR. ENERGY
(Europe Information Service), June 5, 1998, at No. 515 (discussing the desire of
certain Member States to safeguard the coal industry from competition by affording provisions that would require power suppliers to purchase certain percentages
of their requirements from coal producers instead of purchasing all of their requirements from lowest cost providers). Likewise, during the drafting of the Electricity Directive, labor unions argued that introducing true competition would
cause energy companies to lay off employees in order to lower their costs of production, thus the directive should contain provisions protecting the work force. See
Energy Liberalisation: Unions Warn on Gas and Electriciny Directives, EUR.
ENERGY (Europe Information Service), Sept. 27, 1996, at No. 476 (expressing concers of the European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers' Federation that the
Electricity Directive, as written, would have a negative impact on employment).
14. Council Directive 96/92, 1997 O.J. (L 027) 20 [hereinafter Electricity Directive] (prescribing the law establishing a deregulated, single energy market in the
European Union).
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ress of England and Wales in their efforts to meet the requirements
of the Electricity Directive. Part IV develops recommendations for
deregulating the electricity industry in light of the English and Welsh
experience under the framework of the Electricity Directive, and explores how the implementation of the Directive's requirements have
affected the electricity industry in these countries. This Comment
questions whether electricity deregulation can produce a truly competitive industry, given the unwillingness of governments to vest
their faith in the workings of the energy generation 5 and supply 6
markets. 7

I. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE EUROPEAN
UNION'S ENERGY POLICY
A historical overview of the European Union's energy policy is
important for two reasons. First, outlining the historical development
of Europe's efforts to establish a single market in energy demonstrates that Europe's progress has been incremental. 8 Second, historical analysis further illustrates the European Union's hesitance to
favor a singular, cohesive energy policy at the expense of the Member States' authority to regulate their respective energy industries. "

15. See GLOSSARY OF TERMS TASK FORCE, GLOSSARY OF TERMS (1996) (unpublished glossary of electricity terms of the North American Electric Reliability
Council) (on file with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) (defining generation as "the act of producing electrical energy from other forms of energy such
as thermal, mechanical, chemical, or nuclear").
16. See id. (suggesting that the terms "supply," "capability," and "capacity" are
analogous and defining them as "the maximum load [amount] which a generating
unit, station, or other electrical apparatus can carry under specified conditions").
17. See generally James Barker, Jr. et al., Regulation of Power Pools and System Operators:An InternationalComparison, 18 ENERGY L.J. 216, 325 (asserting
that while regulatory structures may create independence of a transmission system

operator, it may not support competition).
18. See Black, supra note 8, at 119 (describing the importance of historical

analysis of Europe's treaties to understand how European law in this area is organic and increasingly moving toward federalism).
19. See, e.g., Dana L. Romaniuk, Regulating Public Monopolies in Furtherance of the EEC Free Competition Goal: Article 90 and the Two-Step Approach,
69 CHI.-K NT L. REv. 1025, 1025 (1994) (observing that the Treaty of Rome
failed to establish a cohesive European Community energy policy because it af-

forded Member States the ability to create monopoly enterprises, thereby preclud-
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This reluctance to eliminate state regulation persists despite the
European Union's expressed desire to achieve a unified energy policy in order to uniformly 0 accomplish the dual objectives of competition 2' and a secure supply2- of energy. One reason underlying the
Member States' hesitation to implement a single energy policy
throughout the European Union is that such a policy is perceived as a
motor thrusting the Member States into political integration.2'
A. THE FIRST TREATIES TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE ENERGY POLICY
Because of the importance of energy to the economic health of a
nation,24 there has always been concern for three major factors affecting the price of energy: supply, use, and production.2: Considering the importance of energy and the potential volatility of these
three factors, Europe first attempted to establish a cohesive energy
community, called the European Coal and Steel Community, in 1951
with the Treaty of Paris. 26 Subsequently, in 1957, the same countries
ing a competitive market).
20. See The Union's Policies-Energy Policy, supra note 6 (stressing the need
for a single energy policy throughout the European Union).
21. See Study Shows Energy Deregulation Is Lowering Costs, ENN DAILY
NEWS (May 15, 1997) <http://www.enn.com/enn-news-archive/ 1997/05/051597
/05159706.asp> (examining one effect of deregulation is competition); see also
Segelken, supra note 9 and accompanying text (suggesting that innovation of
products comes with competition).
22. See The Union's Policies-EnergyPolicy, supra note 6 (characterizing the
need for a secure supply mandate as a Union-wide policy given the 1973 oil crisis).
The 1973 oil crisis provided a warning that the European Union needed to reduce
their dependence on oil imports and needed to diversify their supply sources and
types. See id. The wake of the oil crisis ignited the European Union's desire to develop a single energy policy. See id.
23. See id. (asserting that, given the importance of energy in daily life, a single
energy policy would provide a solid base for further political integration of the
Member States).
24. See id. (describing the economic importance of energy).
25. See Jonathan D. Fishbane, Troubled Evolution of Energv Policy in the
EEC: A DiscordantNote in the HarmonizationProcess, 27 AKRON L. REV. 301,
302 (1994) (noting the historical importance of supply, use, and production in
Europe).
26. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY,
Apr. 8, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 143, 147, 185-95 (creating a foundation for current
European Union energy laws by Article 3, which lays out general objectives, and
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created the European Economic Community ("EEC")27 and the European Atomic Energy Community ("EURATOM") 28 by treaties collectively known as the Treaty of Rome.29 Political differences'"
Articles 57-64, which address production and prices of energy). The Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty") also identified
Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands as original parties to this Treaty. See id. at preamble, 261 U.N.T.S. at 143.
The United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Republic of Ireland acceded on January 1,
1973, subsequent to the signing of the Treaty of Accession in Brussels in 1972. See
Black, supra note 8, at 120 (outlining the chronology of accession for new European Union Members). Greece acceded in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in
1986. See id. (outlining the accession chronology). Finally, Austria, Sweden and
Finland joined the European Union following the fall of the Soviet Union. See id.
(outlining the accession of the most recent European Union Member States).
27.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, March 25,

1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmnd. 5179-11) [hereinafter
EEC TREATY] (establishing useful framework to current European Union energy
policy, particularly those areas addressing rules on the Single Market, competition,
taxation, and trade).
28.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY,

March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (establishing a framework for current European
energy policy, particularly Articles 40-76-which address investment, joint undertakings, and supplies-and Articles 91-100--which address the nuclear common market).
29. See Romaniuk, supra note 19, at 1025. The Treaty of Rome established the
European Economic Community having the principal goal of creating a common
market within the European Community. See id. (remarking on the rationale behind the creation of the Treaty of Rome). The three Communities each established
a Commission, a Council of Ministers to the European Parliament, and a single
Court as distinct entities. See EEC TREATY, supra note 27, art. 4 (explaining the
structure created by the three Communities). The Council is comprised of one
delegate from each Member State whose responsibilities within the Council include making general policy decisions and adopting formal legislation. See Black,
supra note 8, at 120 (explaining the structure of the Council to Parliament in the
European Union). The Commission is comprised of seventeen representatives appointed by agreement of the Member States with larger countries such as France,
Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom having two Commissioners each
while the smaller countries have one each. See id. at 121 (explaining the structure
of the Commission). The Commission members, ordered to act in the interest of
the Union, are responsible for "making policy proposals to the Council, adopting
certain formal acts, and drafting legislative acts for Council adoption." Id. The
Commission is further charged with enforcing the EEC Treaty for violations by a
Member State. See id. (recognizing further that the Commission has the ability to
bring the Member State before the European Court of Justice).
30. See, e.g., Fishbane, supra note 25, at 302 (explaining that France's differing views on nuclear power worked against the development of a cohesive atomic
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among the Member States and lack of explicit language creating a
workable framework3' hindered the efforts of these Member States to
create a cohesive energy policy under the EEC. For example, the
Treaty of Rome allowed Member States to create energy monopolies,
interfering with the EEC's goal of developing a common market fueled by free market competition. 2
B. RECENT EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE ENERGY MARKET

In 1987, in an effort to eliminate the barriers hindering inter-Union
trade, 33 the Member States enacted" the Single European Act." One

energy policy).
31. See id. at 303 (suggesting that Europe's previous attempts to establish a cohesive energy policy were due to an absence of explicit language and implementation framework requiring that such a policy be established). Given the fact that the
EEC Treaty contained neither explicit language regarding energy, nor a regulatory
structure to enforce the goals of the Treaty, no framework was created to encourage the individual Member States to develop an integrated energy policy. See iL.
(commenting on the lack of energy language or regulatory development); see also
id. at 302 (discussing the lack of special provisions to deal with the ameliorating
energy supply by providing alternative energy sources, which likely played a role
in a coal industry crisis in Belgium).
32. See Romaniuk, supra note 19, at 1025 (examining the shortcomings of the
Treaty of Rome in establishing a competitive free market in the European Community).
33. See Black, supra note 8, at 126-27 (listing the types of barriers that have
prevented the development of a single European market). The barriers referred to
may be physical, technical, fiscal, and business. See id. Article 8(a) of the EEC
Treaty eliminated physical barriers and other controls limiting the ability of people
and goods to move freely in 1993. See id. at 126 (citing EEC TREATY, supra note
27, art. 8(a)); Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission
to the European Council, COM(85)310 final at 9-16 [hereinafter Completing the
Internal Market] (defining physical barriers and noting their elimination). Technical barriers include inequitable standards in product or environmental policies or
procurement requirements. See Black, supra note 8, at 126-27 (citing The Internal
Energy Market: Commission of the European Communities, COM(88)238 final at
15 [hereinafter The Internal Energy Market]) (discussing technical barriers). Finally, fiscal and business barriers include conflicting laws, accounting standards,
subsidy regulation and taxation on goods moving across country borders. See
Black, supra note 8, at 127 (defining fiscal and business barriers).
34. See Black, supra note 8, at 127 (asserting that the Single European Act
("SEA") and the EC Treaty marked an evolution of the EEC Treaty where they
sought to strengthen the unity of the Member States and their economies individually and as a whole).
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of the principal objectives of the Act was to establish the "Internal
Energy Market"36 by 1992. 37 In 1988, the European Commission, in
its capacity to make policy proposals
and draft legislative acts for the
• 38th
Council to Parliament's review, examined the varied energy policies of the Member States. The Commission took into account the
European Union's energy goals and compiled their findings in a report called the "Internal Energy Market."" In its April 27, 1988 "Information Memo, 40 the Commission concluded that, apart from the
social and political disparities among the Member States, the biggest
obstacles to creating an internal energy market were concerns about
how to prevent Member States from safeguarding their own supplies
and whether the legal and regulatory system of the European Union
had the authority to prevent such activities." One of the task force
members on Community integration noted that in developing an internal energy market, the European Union needed to focus on decreasing the risk of supply shortage and improving the allotment of
available resources. 41

35.
27).

1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA] (amending EEC TREATY, supra note

36. Common Energy Policy: An Overall View Of Energy Policy And Actions
(visited June
18,
1998) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/sg/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/
127014c.htm>.
37. See Black, supra note 8, at 130 (citing DERRICK WYATT & ALAN
DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 14 (3d ed. 1993)) (reviewing the Act's

focus on development of the internal energy market).
38. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (defining the responsibilities of
the Commission of the European Union).

39. See Fishbane, supra note 25, at 349 (noting the Commission's first step to
creating an internal energy market pursuant to the SEA).
40. The Commission's Information Memo, of 29 March 1988 (P36). See 27
April 1988 (P(88)52) final at 2-3 (reporting the adoption of the communication);
see also The Commission's report to the Council, COM(89) final at 332-36 (proposing an increase in intra-community trade of gas and electricity to continue in-

creasing competition among suppliers).
41. See Fishbane, supra note 25, at 349-50 (discussing the findings of the 27
April 1988 Information Memo).

42. See id. at 350 (outlining N. Commeau-Yannoussis' comments stating that
the energy policy must be capable of creating greater unity among the Member
States than a mere economic policy due to the unique nature of energy).
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Further, aside from the economic significance of energy, the industry is unique in terms of the diversity of both its products and its
end-uses, particularly in Europe."3 Electricity and natural gas systems
require significant capital, given their complex networks of generation, transmission, and distribution." This necessitates a specialized,
common policy to promote efficiency, particularly because each
Member State has developed its own oil and gas infrastructure.Y5
Thus, in 1990, Directive 90/531,' specifically applicable to water,
transport, energy, and communications, opened competition to the
European Union. 7 Two additional Directives are of great import. Directive 90/377, issued on June 29, 1990, establishes a Community
procedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity charged
to industrial end users.4 Directive 90/547, issued on October 29,
1990, addresses the transit of electricity through transmission grids."
Directive 90/377 requires Member States to ensure that their electricity and gas producing, transmitting and distributing entities report
their prices and the details of their pricing mechanisms twice a year,
along with an analysis of their consumer base once every two years,
to the Statistical Office of the European Communities ("SOEC").

43. See Black, supra note 8, at 128 (noting that while coal is not subject to
trade within the European Union, oil is quite competitive).
44. See Butler, supra note 10, at 21-24 (noting the importance of opening up
competition via third party access in order that consumers realize the benefits of an
integrated industry).
45. See id. at 21 (distinguishing the unique nature of electricity and gas markets
and suggesting that efficiency in those markets will result in competition and decreased differences among Member States).
46. See generally Council Directive 90/531, arts. 3-29, 1990 O.J. (L 297) 5-15
(identifying, for example, public procurement rules for the oil and gas industry).
47. See Black, supra note 8, at 127 (noting that the function of Directive
90/531 was to eliminate barriers in various industries, specifically energy).
48. See Council Directive 90/377, 1990 O.J. (L 185) 16 (amended by Council
Directive 93/87, 1993 O.J. (L 277)) (discussing price transparency Directives).
49. See Council Directive 90/547, 1990 O.J. (L 313) 30 (ordering facilitation of
electricity transit between high-voltage grids).
50. Council Directive 90/377, supra note 48, art. 4, 1990 O.J. (L 185) at 16-18
(stating requirements for data submission). See generally Barker, Jr. et al., supra
note 17, at 325 (requiring price data to flow through the SOEC increases the flow
of information; therefore, consumers and regulators are more knowledgeable and
the market will operate more efficiently).
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The SOEC is required to keep all data confidential, and therefore
may only publish its data in aggregate form.' If the SOEC detects
significant abnormalities in the data it receives, it may ask the national authorities for more details 2
Directive 90/547 sets the groundwork for third-party access by defining transit of electricity through transmission grids as requiring
"the grid of origin or final destination be situated within the Community and the transport operation involve crossing at least one intraCommunity frontier."53 Directive 90/547 mandates negotiation of
contracts between the grid operators and the entities in the Member
States responsible for importing and exporting electricity. 4 Further,
the Member States must ensure that the grid operators notify the
Commission and national authorities of supply contracts that have a
duration of at least one year, and also of the termination of such a
contract." Finally, the Directive requires that transit conditions allow
free movement, without compromising either the security of supply
or reliability of service. 6 If grid operators violate the conditions of
transit, the Directive gives the Commission the authority to enforce7
this mandate with procedures allocated to them by Community law.
In 1991, the European Energy Charter was signed at The Hague."
Although the primary purpose of the charter was to inject Western

51.

Council Directive 90/377, supra note 48, art. 4, 1990 O.J. (L 185) at 17

(stating the requirements for confidentiality).
52. See id. art. 5, 1990 O.J. (L 185) at 17 (requiring notice to national authorities in cases of abnormal data).
53. Council Directive 90/547, supra note 49, art. 2, para. l(b)(c), 1990 O.J. (L
313) at 31.

54. See id. art. 3, para. 1, 1990 O.J. (L 313) at 31 (obligating the negotiation of
contracts).
55. See id. art. 3, para. 3, 1990 O.J. (L 313) at 31 (discussing requirements relating to the establishment of a contractual relationship where intra-Community

sale and transport of electricity are involved).
56. See id. art. 3, para. 2, 1990 O.J. (L 313) at 31 (providing conditions to encourage third party open access while maintaining adequate supply and reliable
service).
57. See id. art. 4, 1990 O.J. (L 313) at 32 (providing redress for violations of

transit conditions).
58. See The Union's Policies-Energy Policy, supra note 6 (setting forth rele-

vant legislation that led to the Electricity Directive).
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investment and knowledge into former Soviet countries, it also established legally binding rules in the areas of trade, energy, competition, investment, and access to capital.5' Moreover, the Commission
presented a plan creating a Community Action program and a Consultative Committee of industry experts to assist the Commission in
developing transmission infrastructures and interconnections from
the Member States to the European network. Because many Member States have their own networks that are not connected to the
European network, the Commission decided to implement third party
6
access
12 in three stages. ' The first stage mandated improved transparency of electricity and gas prices charged to end-users, and arrangements for transmission
of the same between the main networks
of the European Union. 63 The second stage, which began in 1992,
eliminated several restrictions on equal access relative to hydrocarbons, and provided common rules for gas and electricity that recommended third-party open access.' The third stage is the enabling
stage, which combines the internal market of its component parts
from the previous stages."

59. Id.
60. See Achevement du Marche Interieur du Gaz et de L'Electricite: Communication to Commission of the European Communities, COM(91)298 Texte E par.
5.2 at 7 [hereinafter Achevement du Gaz et de L'Electricite] (outlining the need for
a special gas and electricity directive).
61. See Black, supra note 8, at 129 n.102 (explaining why the Commission
found the need for three stages); see also Butler, supra note 10, at 22 (noting that
certain Member States, such as Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, already
have laws restricting a utility's right to use transmission and distribution systems).
62. See Internal Market for Energ': Gas and Electricity Price Transparency
(visited June 3, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/sgscadplus.lleg/en/lvb/127002.
htm> (defining price transparency by its purpose, which is to increase consumers'
freedom of choice by free exchange of information without compromising confidentiality).
63. See Internal Market For Energ': Current Position and Outlook (visited
June 3, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/sg/scadplusileg/en/lvb'127001.htm>
(delineating the three stages of the European Union's efforts to create a single energy market).
64. See id. (discussing requirements of the second stage and noting the conflicting views of third party access among Member States).
65. See id. (outlining requirements of the third stage).
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In 1992, the Treaty Establishing the European Community,66 better
known as the Maastricht Treaty, further developed the European
Union's goals for a single economic market through the principle of
subsidiarity.67 The principle becomes effective when Member States
cannot adequately address the proposed action because of the size or
effect of such proposals, thus allowing the Union to take action outside areas specifically delegated to it.68 The formulation of the subsidiarity principle, therefore, ensures a preservation of the rights of
each individual citizen within the European Union.69
Decision 1254/96 of the Council to the European Parliament, issued on June 6, 1990, established a series of guidelines that covers
objectives, priorities, and projects of common interest with respect to
the trans-European energy networks.'" This Decision, which realized
the trans-European objective set forth by Title XII in the Treaty Establishing the European Community, is of critical importance to the
creation of a single energy market.7 ' The Decision is applicable in
electricity networks to high-voltage lines and any equipment necessary for the system to operate properly.72 The Community's purpose
66. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992,
1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC
(establishing important framework for current European Union energy
policy, particularly Title XII dealing with trans-European networks). See also I
PETES E. HERZOG & HAN S. SMIT, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY 55 (1998) (explaining that the Treaty on the
European Union or Maastricht Treaty added to the European Community by expanding the scope of activities).
TREATY]

67. See generally Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the
European Union, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 616-18, 625-28 (1994) (discussing

the principle of subsidiarity).
68. See EC TREATY, supra note 66, art. 3b (describing the principle of subsidiarity).
69. See id. at preamble (noting subsidiarity guarantees "decisions are taken as
closely as possible to the citizen").
70. See Council Decision 1254/96, art. 1, 1996 O.J. (L 161) 147, 148 (amended

by Council Decision 1047/97, 1997 O.J. (L 152)) (discussing interconnectivity of
transmission lines among Member States).
71.

See The Union's Policies-Energy Policy, supra note 6 (discussing the legal

base and key policies used to establish the European Union's current energy policy).
72. See Council Decision 1254/96, supra note 70, art. 2, para. 1, 1996 O.J. (L
161) at 148 (stating the applicability of Directive 1254/96).
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for this Decision-which promotes interconnection, interoperability,
access to and development of the networks-is to allow effective operation of the internal energy market, strengthen economic and social
cohesion, and reinforce the security of the Community's energy supply.73 The priorities for actions relating to electricity networks include the connection of isolated electricity networks to the interconnected European networks, the development of interconnections
between Member States, and the development of interconnections
with European countries attempting to accede into the Union, and to"
supply.
contribute to the improvement of reliability and security of
Electricity interconnection projects due for completion by the year
2000 include connections between France and Spain, and France and
Italy.
In 1992, the Council to the European Parliament submitted its initial proposal that set forth common rules for a single electricity market.76 The European Parliament suggested certain amendments to this
draft on November 17, 1993." The European Commission approved
amended proposals drafted by the Directorate General for Energy
(DG XVII) on December 8, 1993 for common rules in the electricity
sector.78 On December 19, 1996, the Council and the European Par73. See id. art. 1, 1996 O.J. (L 161) at 148 (delineating purposes of Directive
1254/96).
74. See id. art. 3, 1996 O.J. (L 161) at 148 (listing priorities of Directive
1254/96).
75. See The Union's Policies-Energy Policy, supra note 6 (outlining the projects for interconnection that are to be completed by the year 2000).
76. See Gas/Electricity: Commission Unveils Amended Internal Market Proposals, EUR. ENERGY (Europe Information Service), Dec. 17, 1993, at No. 414
(identifying the inception of the Electricity Directive).
77. See id. (examining the process of review the Electricity Directive underwent).
78. See id. (finding that the amended proposals differed significantly from both
the original Directive submission and the European Parliament's suggestions for
amendments). The Directorate General's amendments addressed the concerns of
the European Parliament differently, even though the concerns accounted for the
Directorate General's amendments. See id. (listing the European Parliament's concerns as "supply security, environmental protections, small consumer protection,
transparency and price discrimination, recognition of the structural differences of
existing systems, and provisions of transition service"). Further division between
the Parliament and Commission on the amended proposal was evident regarding
the division of the amended proposals into seven chapters. See id. (observing that
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liament adopted Directive 96/92 ("Electricity Directive") as a culmination of the European Union's decades of efforts to establish a single market in electricity. 9 The Electricity Directive marks an important step toward the development of a single internal energy market
in Europe as it requires Member States to implement legislationspecifically relating to electricity-by combining elements of
previous Directives that promote competition through the elimination
of barriers, while assuring reliable service and security of supply. ""
Therefore, an examination of the text of the Electricity Directive is

appropriate.

II. THE MANDATES OF THE ELECTRICITY
DIRECTIVE
A. THE APPLICABILITY TO MEMBER STATES
The purpose of the Electricity Directive is to establish common
rules" for the generation,82 transmission, 3 and distribution 4 of electricity. Article 3 requires Member States to implement their electricity undertakings in conformance with the principles of the Electricity

the Commission approved amendments different from both the original proposal
and the Parliament's amendments).
79. See generally Electricity Directive, supra note 14, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 2034 (providing common rules for a single market in electricity).
80. See id. at preamble, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 20-22 (discussing the intent behind creating this Directive). Furthermore, the Council to the European Parliament
required that the Member States implement the mandates of the Directive by February 19, 1999. See id. art. 27, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 29 (setting forth the effective
date of the legislation).
81. See id. art. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 22 (establishing rules for the organization and functioning of electricity sector, market access, and the procedure applicable to calls for tender, the granting of authorizations, and operation of systems).
82. See id. art. 2, para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 22 (defining generation as "the
production of electricity").
83. See id. art. 2, para. 5, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 22 (defining transmission as the
"transport of electricity on the high voltage interconnected system with a view to
its delivery to final customers or to distributors").
84. See id. art. 2, para. 6, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 22 (defining distribution as "the
transport of electricity on medium-voltage and low-voltage distribution systems
with a view to its delivery to customers").
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Directive, thereby taking into account the principle of subsidiarity."
However, Article 3 does permit Member States to opt out of several
important Articles if they can sufficiently justify their decision."
B. RULES RELATING TO THE GENERATION OF ELECTRICITY
Articles 4 through 6 constitute Chapter III, which deals with rules
relating to the selection of power generation sources.' ' Article 4 provides some flexibility, allowing Member States to choose" between
an authorization procedure 9 or a tendering procedure." Article 5 re85. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 3,para. i, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
23 (creating a mandate for Member States to implement the principles of this Directive, which include attaining a competitive market in electricity through nondiscriminatory undertakings as to rights or obligations). Article 3, therefore, creates
the link necessary for European Union law to require action by Member States to
implement the measures of the Directive. See also EC TREATY, supra note 66, art.
3b (establishing the principle of subsidiarity within the structure of the European
Union).
86. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14. art. 3,para. 3, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
23 (stating that Member States may choose not to apply provisions of Articles 5, 6,
17, 18 and 21 if doing so would be contrary to the general economic interest of the
State insofar as it would either hinder the performance of the State's existing obligations or impede the interest of the Community in developing trade). When a
Member State claims that implementing the above mentioned articles would hinder
their public service obligations, they must clearly define such obligations and notify the Commission promptly. See id. (requiring that existing public service obligations be "transparent, nondiscriminatory and verifiable").
87. See id. arts. 4-6, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 23-24 (discussing criteria for establishing competition in generation).
88. See id. art. 4, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 23 (discussing the ability of Member
States to choose which generation procedure best suits their internal structure); see
also Harper, supra note 4, at 601 (noting that the relative sizes and structures of
Member States' energy industries play a role in maintaining national control as opposed to following a comprehensive European Union energy policy).
89. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 5,para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
23 (requiring a Member State opting for an authorization procedure in generation
to establish a list of criteria for granting authorizations for constructing new generation facilities). The Article lists the criteria a Member State may consider in
formulating its own authorization standards. See id. (listing, among other things,
"safety and security of the electricity system, protection of the environment, energy efficiency, and characteristics particular to the applicant"); see also
Gas/Electricity: Commission Unveils Amended Internal Market Proposals,supra
note 76, at No. 414 (recognizing differences in Parliament's amendment recommendations and the Commission submissions for the Directive Article relating to
authorization procedures).
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quires that each Member State make public the criterion established
for the authorization procedure. 9 ' Moreover, the Member State must
give the applicants who were denied authorization well-justified,
nondiscriminatory reasons supporting the decision." Finally, the Article provides for an appeals process.93
Article 6 similarly requires that the appropriate body publish the
detailed specifications of the tendering procedure in the Official
Journal of the European Communities. Article 6 provides Member
States with the flexibility to designate an authority-public or private-which is independent of generation, transmission, and distribution functions, to organize, monitor, and control the tendering procedure. 95

90. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 6, para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
23 (mandating that either the Member State or a designated body establish a tendering procedure by creating "an inventory of new means of production, including
replacement capacity .... [and by taking into account] the need for interconnection
of systems..."). The tendering procedure then allocates capacity, which is based
on a regular estimate of generating and transmission capacity likely connected to
the system, the need for other interconnectors, the potential transmission capacity,
and the demand for electricity. See id. (discussing the elements of the regular estimate needed to create the tendering procedure).
91. See id. art. 5, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 23 (relating to the importance of transparency in creating a nondiscriminatory energy market); see also Commnunit,
Laws: Delays in the Transpositionof Energy Legislation, supra note 5, at No. 496
(finding that implementation of price transparency mandates was completed in all
Member States).
92. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 5, para. 2, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
23 (ensuring justifiable reasons behind denial of applications for authorization as
such reasons and denials are forwarded to the Commission).
93. See id. (mandating that Member States establish an appeal process).
94. See id. art. 6, para. 3, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24 (relating to the transparency
of procedures to ensure a nondiscriminatory market in generation); see also Comnunity Law: Delays in the Transposition of Energy Legislation, supra note 5, at
No. 496 (outlining the completion of implementing price transparency legislation
in Member States).
95. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 6, para. 5, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
24 (noting that the designated body must keep the tendering procedure nondiscriminatory and the information submitted by each applicant confidential).
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C. RULES RELATING TO TRANSMISSION SYSTEM OPERATION

Articles 7 through 9 constitute Chapter IV of the Directive, addressing transmission system operation." Article 7 requires Member
States, or transmission system owners at the direction of the Member
States, to designate a system operator " obligated to operate, ensure
the maintenance of, and, if necessary, develop both a transmission
system and its interconneitors with other systems to guarantee the
security of supply. 98 Article 7 further mandates Member States to implement certain nondiscriminatory, objective requirements" to guarantee the interoperability of systems. ' To ensure nondiscriminatory
behavior on the part of the system operator, Article 7 requires that
the operator be independent of any generation and distribution activities, at least from a management standpoint."" Article 8 further

96. See id. arts. 7-9, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24-25 (discussing rules relating to
transmission system operation in the European Union).
97. See id. art. 7, para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24 (establishing the responsibilities of the system operator). These responsibilities include managing energy flows
in the system while accounting for exchanges with interconnected systems to ensure the security, reliability, and efficiency of the electricity system as well as
guarantying the availability of necessary ancillary services. See id. art. 7, para. 3,
1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24 (discussing the duties of the system operator). Article 2 defines ancillary services as "all services necessary for the operation of a transmission or distribution system." Id. art. 2, para. 14, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 22. Article 7
charges the system operator with the duty not to discriminate between system users
or classes thereof. See id. art. 7, para. 5, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24 (stating that the
system operator must operate the transmission system in a nondiscriminatory manner so as not to favor its own subsidiaries or shareholders).
98. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 7, para. I, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
24 (discussing the appointment and responsibilities of the system operator).
99. See id. art. 7, para. 2, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24 (noting that the Member
States must notify the Commission of their requirements). Article 8 of Council Directive 83/189 provides this reporting requirement, which established the procedure for information exchange in technical standards and regulations. See Council
Directive 83/189, art. 8, 1983 O.J. (L 109) 8, 11 (setting forth procedural standards
for technical requirements).
100. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 7, para. 2, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
24 (requiring Member States to publish and implement minimum technical design
and operational standards for connection of generation assets, distribution systems,
and interconnector circuits).
101. See id. art. 7, para. 6, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24 (noting the independence requirement of the system operator to ensure nondiscriminatory management of the
transmission system); see also Gas/Electricity: Commission Unveils Amended In-
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discusses the responsibilities of the system operator in terms of determining the use of interconnectors with other systems and the dispatch of generating installations.' 2 Lastly, Article 9 requires the system operator to preserve the confidentiality of information acquired
in the course of carrying out its responsibilities.'03
D. RULES RELATING TO DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OPERATION
Chapter V encompasses Articles 10 through 12,'" addressing distribution system operation.' 5 Article 10 allows Member States to obligate distribution companies to supply customers in a particular
area. 0 6 As seen with the transmission system operator, the Member
States, or owners of distribution companies, must designate a distribution system operator having the same responsibilities as the transmission system operator.' 7 Article 11 establishes that the distribution
system operator must maintain "a secure, reliable and efficient elec-

ternal Market Proposals,supra note 76 (discussing independence requirement of
the transmission system operator). Cf., e.g., Order No. 888, supra note 10, 18
C.F.R. pts. 35, 27, 38; Order No. 888-A, supra note 10, 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37 (establishing guidance provisions for establishing independent governance and financial interests of system operators in the United States).
102. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 8, para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
24. Article 8 further mandates that the system operator make nondiscriminatory
decisions regarding generating installations and interconnections. See id. art. 8,
para. 2, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24.
103. See id. art. 9, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 25 (stating confidentiality of information
as a requirement for the system operator in carrying out its duties).
104. See id. arts. 10-12, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 25 (discussing the responsibilities
of the distribution system operator); see also Gas/Electricity: Commission Unveils
Amended Internal Market Proposals, supra note 76 (rejecting Parliament's recommendation to allow Member States to retain their power over local and regional
distribution authorities in favor of merely allowing Member States to define the
rights and public service obligations assigned to distribution companies and their
customers).
105. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, arts. 10-12, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
25 (discussing the scope of Chapter V).
106. See id. art. 10, para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 25 (stating further that Member
States may regulate a distributor by imposing a tariff on supplies in order to ensure
equal treatment of customers).
107. See id. art. 10, para. 2, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 25 (outlining the responsibilities of the distribution system operator); cf supra notes 97-98 and accompanying
text (discussing the responsibilities of the transmission system operator).
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tricity distribution system in its area, with due regard for the environment."'' 3 Similar to Article 9, Article 12 requires the distribution
system operator to preserve the confidentiality of information acquired in the course of carrying out its responsibilities.'"
E. RULES ADDRESSING UNBUNDLING AND TRANSPARENCY OF
ACCOUNTS

Chapter VI consists of Articles 13 through 15, and addresses the
concepts of unbundling" ° and transparency.' of accounts." 2 Transparency of accounts requires electric companies, regardless of their
ownership structure, to organize, submit to an audit, and publish their
annual accounts."' The concept of unbundling relates to transparency
of accounts in that integrated electricity undertakings"' are required
108. Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 11, para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
25.
109. See id. art. 12, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 25 (requiring preservation of the confidentiality of sensitive information obtained by the distribution system operator in
the course of business).
110. See id. arts. 14-15, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 25-26 (describing unbundling as a
literal separation of transmission, distribution, and generation accounts).
111. See id. arts. 13-14, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 25-26 (establishing transparency of
accounts by granting Member States, a designated authority, or dispute settlement
authorities the right of access to generation, transmission, and distribution accounts).
112. See id. arts. 13-15, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 25-26 (discussing how Member
States must achieve unbundling and transparency of accounts); see also Council
Directive 78/660, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11 (establishing national law concerning annual accounts of limited liability companies which set a framework for the Electricity Directive's mandates for transparent accounts); and Council Directive
83/349, art. 42, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1, 15 (requiring recording of transactions of a
certain size conducted between affiliates in financial statement footnotes);
Gas/Electricity: Commission Unveils Amended Internal Market, sulpra note 76
(rejecting Parliament's suggestion to include cost, not just price, transparency requirements).
113. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 14, para. 2, 1997 O.J. (L 027)
at 25 (indicating that undertakings not legally obliged to publish their annual accounts shall keep a copy in their home office for review by the public).
114. See id. art. 2, para. 17, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 22 (defining an "integrated
electricity undertaking" as one that is either vertically or horizontally integrated).
A vertically integrated undertaking performs two or more of the functions of generation, transmission, or distribution. See id. art. 2, para. 18, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
22 (defining vertical integration in electricity). A horizontally integrated under-
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to keep separate their internal accounts for their generation, transmission, and distribution activities." '
F. RULES ADDRESSING ACCESS PROCEDURES

Chapter VII contains Articles 16 through 22, which address the
organization of access to the system."6 Member States are allowed to
select either one or both of the organizational procedures set forth in
Articles 17 and 18.117 Article 17 addresses an organizational procedure called "negotiated access to the system.""' This procedure requires each Member State to take measures that allow electricity
generating entities, supply undertakings, and eligible customers,
whether inside or outside the territory of the system, to negotiate access to the system and to complete supply contracts with each other
based on voluntary commercial agreements.'
Article 18 addresses an alternative system access procedure called
the "single buyer procedure." 0 This procedure requires the Member
State to appoint a legal person to be the single buyer of power within

taking performs at least one of the functions of generation, transmission or distribution, and another non-electricity activity. See id. art. 2, para. 19, 1997 O.J. (L
027) at 22 (defining horizontal integration specific to electricity).
115. See id. art. 14, para. 3, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 25 (noting that unbundling may
also require consolidated accounts for other, non-electricity activities to avoid discrimination, cross-subsidization, and distortion of competition); see also
Gas/Electricity: Commission Unveils Amended Internal Market Proposals, supra
note 76 (finding that the Electricity Directive does not require unbundling of management, but rather guarantees the independence of the network system operator).
116. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, arts. 16-22, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
26-28 (setting forth various procedures Member States may select, as well as baseline rules with which Member States must comply, in order to operate their electricity systems in conformance with the European Union energy principles of objectivity, transparency, and non-discrimination).
117. See id. art. 16, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 26 (discussing the opportunity for
Member States to select the procedures best suited to the internal structure of their
own electricity system).
118. Id. art. 17, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 26.
119. See id. art. 17, para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 26 (describing the principle of
negotiated access to the system).
120. See id. art. 18, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 26-27 (setting forth the framework for
the single buyer system access procedure).
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the territory governed by the relevant system operator." Article 19
discusses the goals Member States must achieve in order to create a
single market in electricity, and concludes with a provision allowing
for Commission supervision over the opening of electricity markets.'2
G. OTHER PROVISIONS

Article 22 mandates that Member States create a regulatory regime, as well as control and transparency mechanisms to protect
against abuses of dominant positions and other anti-competitive behaviors.' Finally, Chapter VIII, which includes Articles 23 through
29, addresses a variety of issues, including emergency supply short-

121. See id. art. 18, para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 26 (defining the single buyer
procedure).
122. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 19, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 27
(discussing goals Member States must work toward in establishing a single electricity market in the European Union). These goals include a variety of measures
related to previous articles. For example, Member States must provide legislation
that ensures that contracts proposed under the provisions of Articles 17 and 18 obtain finalization to a significant level. See, e.g., id. art. 19, para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L
027) at 27 (mandating the completion of existing contracts to decrease system use
by independent, local parties and increase use among various Member States). Article 19 further requires reduced national energy consumption goals. See I. art. 19,
para. 2, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 27 (creating thresholds for reduction of energy consumption on a national level by increments of GWh per the first three years after
implementation of this Directive then another reduction of GWh three years after
the first reduction). Member States must also specify which customers and distribution companies remain eligible to contract within the provisions of Articles 17
and 18. See id. art. 19, para. 3, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 27 (requiring Member States to
publish a listing of these eligible customers and the specifications for eligibility). If
Member States fail to comply with the reporting requirements relating to eligible
customers, the Commission has the authority to exercise its powers to implement
these requirements under Procedure I of Council Directive 87/373. See id. art. 19,
para. 4, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 27 (discussing authority of the Commission to implement these goals within Member States if the Member States fail to do so); see
also Council Directive 87/373, art. 2, 1987 O.J. (L 197) 33, 33-34 (discussing actions the Commission may take against a Member State for noncompliance with
the Directive).
123. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 22, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 28
(mandating that Member States implement regulations and controls to ensure that a
fair, competitive electricity market exists).

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[14:761

ages and transition services, as well as Member States' obligations to
implement this Directive. 24'
H. REVIEWING THE SUCCESS OF THE ELECTRICITY DIRECTIVE
The Electricity Directive, thus far, has successfully furthered the
establishment of a framework for a competitive market in electricity.' 25 A primary example of this framework is that the Directive pro-

vides several options for implementation of certain requirements,
such as the negotiated access versus single buyer options for power

purchases. 26 These types of options within the text of the Directive

124. See id. arts. 23-29, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 28-29 (discussing the final provisions of the Electricity Directive). Specifically, Article 23 provides the Member
States with the ability to take necessary measures in the instance of sudden crisis in
the energy market. See id. art. 23, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 28 (establishing energy
emergency provisions). Article 24 provides the safeguard of allowing a Member
State to apply to the Commission for transitional service if the Member State had
commitments, or guarantees of operation created prior to the implementation of
this Directive that became void as a result of the provisions of this Directive. See
id. art. 24, para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 28-29 (requiring the establishment of transition service as the market shifts from regulated to deregulated). Article 25 requires the Commission to report on the overall progress of harmonization of the
European Union's energy market, not linked to the provisions of the Electricity Directive, within one year of the implementation of the Directive. See id. art. 25,
para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 29 (requiring the examination of the overall progress
of the European Union in achieving a single market in electricity.) Under this article, the Commission retains the authority to make additional proposals. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 25, para. 2, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 29. Article 27
requires Member States to create laws, regulations, and administrative provisions
needed to comply with the provisions of this Directive by February 19, 1999. See
id. art. 27, para. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 29 (mandating that Member States create
the necessary legislation to implement the provisions of the Electricity Directive).
The Commission gave Belgium and Ireland one-year extensions and Greece a twoyear extension to apply the provisions of this Directive due to the technical characteristics of their electricity systems at the time this Directive was created. See id.
art. 27, para. 2, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 29; ElectricityDirective Enters Into Force on
Februaiy 19, EUR. ENERGY (Europe Information Service), Feb. 14, 1997, at No.
485 (indicating that the Commission gave Member States extended deadlines to
implement the Electricity Directive).
125. See Community Law: Delays In The Transposition of Energy Legislation,
supra note 5, at 1 (declaring that 87% of energy sector measures were implemented by the end of 1996); see also Harper, supra note 4, at 604 (maintaining that
substantial privatization has occurred in Spain, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom prior to the implementation of the Electricity Directive).
126. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, arts. 16-18, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
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account27for the different existing electricity structures in the Member
States.

In direct opposition to its purported objective, however, the Directive has several shortcomings that may hinder the development of a
truly competitive market.'2' First, the Directive does not require environmental protection.29 Rather, it suggests that Member States need
only consider the environment in establishing competitive electricity
markets.'30 Second, the Directive relies on other treaties for enforcing
its objectives instead of including enforcement provisions within the
Directive's own text.' For example, Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty
prohibits a Member State from anti-competitive behavior."2 Strict
compliance with the above provision, however, would render ineffective the Electricity Directive's Article 23 provision, which allows
a Member State to temporarily take safeguard measures to ensure the
security of its energy supply in emergency situations.' The Direc26-27; see also supra text accompanying note 117 (allowing each Member State to
select a system access procedure best suited for the existing structure of that Member State's electricity system).
127. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 20; see also
supra text accompanying note 86 (discussing the ability Member States have to opt
out of certain provisions including, among others, Articles 17 and 18, if the implementation of those provisions would be contrary to their general economic interest).
128. See generally 3 Hurdles Seen .for Electriciw"Deregulation, ENN DAILY
NEWS (June 3, 1998) <http:/Avww.enn.com:80lnews/ennstories1998/06/060398'
dereg.asp> (indicating several problems that may occur in a deregulated electricity
environment).
129. See generally Electricity Directive, supra note 14, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 20
(finding no language in any provision that requires environmental protection).
130. See id. art. 5, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 23 (suggesting that Member States consider environmental protection as they develop criteria for authorizing the construction of generating facilities).
131. See Romaniuk, supra note 19, at 1030 (analyzing the function of Article 90
of the EEC Treaty to police for anti-competitive behavior).
132. See EEC TREATY, supra note 27, art. 85(1) (prohibiting "all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their
object or effect the prevention or distortion of competition ....
").
133. See generally Fishbane, supra note 25, at 318 (questioning whether the application of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, which prohibits competition distortions, works contrary to companies operating within the framework of the International Energy Program provision, which requires countries to equitably distribute
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tive itself should have its own enforcement mechanisms rather than
that may be contrary
relying on other treaties that contain provisions 34
Directive.
Electricity
the
of
provisions
to certain

III. AN ANALYSIS OF ENGLAND AND WALES'
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ELECTRICITY
DIRECTIVE'S REQUIREMENTS
For several reasons, England and Wales provide illustrative examples of the progress European Union Member States have made in
complying with the mandates of the Electricity Directive. First,
England and Wales are the global forerunners in privatization efforts.'35 These two states began privatization initiatives in 1989 under
the guidance of the 1989 Electricity Act, which predates the Electricity Directive. The effects of privatization, therefore, are more obvious in England and Wales.'36 Second, for the past forty years, the
public sector in these two countries, as in most other countries,
owned the industry.'3 7 Finally, the experience of England and Wales
also illustrates some of the implementation problems that require
European Union action.'38
A. ENGLAND AND WALES-PRE-PRVATIZATION

England and Wales nationalized their electricity supply industries
following World War II because of a perpetual and problematic
oil in a time of crisis).

134. See generally id. at 319-20 (concluding that the Commission utilized EEC
Treaty Article 85(3) to negate the restrictive effects of subsection one of the Article and illustrating the inefficiency of a process that requires searching for loopholes to negate restrictive effects of prior legislation that could be avoided by including enforcement provisions within the new legislation).
135. See The UK Electricity System (visited June 19, 1998) <http:
//eerr.notes.org/uk/how-work.htm> (recognizing England and Wales as the prototypes of electricity privatization).
136. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (establishing the inception
of privatization in the United Kingdom).
137. See id. (noting the prior ownership structure of the energy industry in the
United Kingdom, and most other countries throughout the world).
138. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 204 (discussing structural problems
occurring in England and Wales resulting from functional unbundling of generation, transmission, and distribution).
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shortage of generating supply."" The nationalized structure in England and Wales yielded one company in charge of generation and
transmission, the Central Electricity Generating Board ("CEGB"),
and twelve distribution companies, referred to as area boards, responsible for maintaining and building distribution lines in specific
140
areas.
The idea of privatizing this industry began in the 1980s under
Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Party Government, which argued
that public ownership bred inefficiencies, particularly in the case of
utilities.14 ' The Conservative Party further believed that monopoly
power in the industry was not necessary to ensure reliable service at
reasonable prices.'42 While these general rationales lead in part to the

139. See ElectricityReform Abroad and U.S. Investment: The Structure of U.K.
Electricity Prior to Privatization (last modified Oct. 22, 1997)
<http://www.eia.doc.gov/emen!pgem/electric/ch2/ I.html> (addressing the original
nationalization of the electricity industry in the U.K.).
140. See The U.K Electricity System, supra note 135 (discussing the makeup of
the pre-privatized electricity industry in the United Kingdom). The area boards
were obligated to purchase power from the CEGB at a uniform national tariff, the
Bulk Supply Tariff. See id. (demonstrating the fact that area boards had little control over the pricing of power they were required to purchase). The CEGB was
perceived as efficient in terms of its constructing and operating the transmission
grid, and dispatching power, but was perceived as lacking in purchasing, managerial, and planning skills. See id. (examining strengths and weaknesses of the
CEGB). Because it was government owned, the CEGB had little flexibility in purchasing and was forced, by government policy, to make purchases from British
companies, regardless of whether the CEGB could have secured a lower price
elsewhere. See id. (noting government influence over the CEGB's purchasing policies, which often resulted in purchases made at higher prices). The CEGB's managerial incompetence was evidenced in matters ranging from its lack of oversight in
construction projects resulting in cost-overruns to over-staffing headquarters. See
Michael C. Brower et al., The British Electricity RestructuringEvperience: History
and Lessons for the United States (Nat'l Council on Competition and the Electric
Utility Indus., East Sussex, United Kingdom), Oct. 1996 (visited June 19, 1998)
<http://eerr.notes.org/ukfrestdabal htm> (discussing the CEGB's managerial problems); see also Leigh Hancher, The Public Sector as Object and Instrument of
Economic Policy, in LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ECONOMIC POLICY 165, 188

(Terence Daintith ed., 1988) (discussing the Conservative Party's transformation
of the CEGB).
141. See Brower et al., supra note 140 (discussing the inception of privatization
in the United Kingdom under the leadership and ideals of the Conservative Party).
142. See id. (setting forth the rationales of the Conservative Party behind their
privatization of the utility industry). The authors note that other considerations
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privatization of the electricity industry, three additional factors contributed to the ultimate formation and timing of privatized electricity
in England and Wales.14 First, the government of the United Kingdom wanted to promote nuclear electricity generation, which would
be difficult in a completely competitive, privatized market.'4' Second,
the government sought to undermine the power of the National Union of Mineworkers, which historically was against the Conservative
Party.'4 ' Third, the Thatcher Administration wanted to complete the
energy privatization process
before the next election in order to en4
1
implementation.
its
sure
B. ENGLAND AND WALES-PRIVATIZED

The present structure of the English and Welsh electric industries
required privatizing the twelve area boards into Regional Electricity
Companies ("RECs") and splitting the CEGB into four separate entities, three of them as competing generating companies and the fourth

played into the United Kingdom's decision to privatize their utility industry. See
id. (discussing the government's less obvious reasons for privatization). One such
consideration was the government's desire to implement a "share-owning democracy" whereby the public owns large portions of privatized companies. See id. (desiring public ownership of companies, but seeking to establish a low risk of loss to
the investor to successfully implement this idea). Another factor the Conservative
Party considered in deciding whether to implement privatization was their desire to
raise revenues. See id. (noting that revenues raised by privatization were approximately $1.5 billion a year). Finally, a subtle factor influencing the government's
decision was that a privatization program would weaken the then-powerful trade
unions. See id. (describing that trade unions prior to privatization had the power to
shut down government-owned businesses).
143. See id. (noting three additional factors specific to the electricity industry
privatization initiative).
144. See id. (reasoning that the privatized structure of the industry would be
conducive to the nuclear energy sector due to its risky and capital-intensive nature,
if the government establishes incentives to ensure generation companies continue
purchasing power from nuclear energy manufacturers).
145. See id. (reasoning that a privatized electric industry would no longer force
power purchases from British companies, thereby forcing price reductions or lost
business to cheaper foreign competitors, each having the effect of reducing Union
power).
146. See id. (noting the three-year time frame before the next election to complete privatization of the electricity industry and fearing reversal of the process if
the Conservatives lost the subsequent election).
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as a monopoly transmission company.' ' The RECs retained the same
responsibilities as did the area boards, which maintain and construct
distribution lines for their respective regions.'"" The RECs, however,
were subject to an accounting change whereby the monopoly function 49 was split from the supply business"' that was subject to competition.' This functional separation satisfies the Electricity Directive's Chapter V mandates regarding the establishment of a
distribution system operator,5 2 as well as the requirements set forth
in Chapter IV regarding unbundling and transparency of accounts.'"
C. GENERATION IN PRIVATIZED ENGLAND AND WALES

The old CEGB was divided into two large fossil fuel generatorsNational Power and PowerGen-and a nuclear generator-Nuclear
Electric.T Shares in National Power and PowerGen were offered on
the London Stock Exchange and sold to the private sector, while Nu-

147. See Brower et al., supra note 140 (discussing the privatized structure of
England and Wales' electric utility industry); see also The UK Electrici ' Systemi,

supra note 135 (discussing the privatized structure of the electricity industry in the
England and Wales).

148. See The UK Electricity Systen. supra note 135 (noting further that each
REC maintained control over its franchise area until 1998 when customers are
scheduled to choose their own power suppliers).
149. See Brower et al., supra note 140 (defining the monopoly function of the
RECs as the physical infrastructure of the distribution wires).
150. See id. (including functions such as purchasing and selling power to endusers as elements of the supply business subject to competition).
151. See id. (analyzing the changes in the structure of the RECs due to privatization).
152. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, arts. 10-12, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at
25 (addressing the establishment and requisite duties of the distribution system operator); see also supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing the responsibilities of the distribution system operator).
153. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, arts. 13-15, 1997 0.. (L 027) at
25-26 (addressing unbundling and transparency of accounts); see also supra notes
110-15 and accompanying text (discussing Electricity Directive's mandates for
price transparency and unbundling of accounts in establishing system access criteria).
154. See The UK Electricit , Systen, supra note 135 (discussing the division of
the CEGB into three generation companies).
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clear Electric remained in the public sector until 1996." These three
generating companies, when initially privatized, did not have a captive market in England and Wales, however, and were subject to
competition from other United Kingdom
generation companies, such
6
Hydro-Electric.'1
and
Power
as Scottish
The electricity generation market within England and Wales, and
throughout the entire United Kingdom, is becoming increasingly
more competitive.1 7 This increased level of competition is due in part
to an increasing number of market entrants.' There are several reasons behind the increasing number of competitors entering the generation market. First, the use of natural gas plants instead of coal
plants has significantly decreased the operating expenses of generating companies due to the current low market price of natural gas.'59
Second, the lower costs of constructing and maintaining power producing facilities has allowed more entrants into the market. 6 ' Conse-

155. See id. (setting forth the ownership structure of the United Kingdom's generation companies since the privatization initiative); see also supra text accompanying note 145 (reasoning that the nuclear generation facility likely remained in
the public sector due to the government's desire to protect nuclear development).
156. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (noting that the three old
CEGB generating companies in England and Wales are now competing with electricity companies from different countries).
157. See id. (discussing the increased level of competition in electricity generation).
158. See id. (relating increased competition in the generation market to new
market entrants).
159. See id. (describing that gas power generation facilities decrease operating
expenses due to the low cost of combined cycle gas turbines, "CCGTs," the short
construction times of gas plants, and less externality expense due to reduced emissions of toxic gases as compared to coal power generating facilities). The downside of these inexpensively constructed and operated gas plants is that demand for
energy in the United Kingdom is forecasted to rise minimally over the next decade,
thereby edging older plants, such as nuclear facilities that require more capital to
operate, out of business. See id. (discussing the problem of increasing generation
market entrants with decreased demand for power); see also Brower et al., supra
note 140 (noting that protection of nuclear power may have created a weakness in
the British electricity restructuring initiative).
160. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (alluding to the fact that
lower start-up prices allow entry into the market, which increases competition).
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quently, while the cost of power decreases, the price of power on the
open commodity market, called "the Pool," should decrease. '
D. TRANSMISSION IN PRIVATIZED ENGLAND AND WALES

The last entity formed by the breakup of the CEGB was the company established to own and operate the transmission system, the
National Grid Company ("NGC"). "2 The NGC's mission is to facilitate competition and administer "financial settlement following the
trading of electricity in the wholesale competitive market through
NGC Settlements, Ltd.' 63 Originally, the RECs jointly held majority
ownership of the NGC; but, in December 1995, the NGC was listed
on the stock market for ownership by the private sector. I"
The NGC's establishment is the most important element to the
newly restructured electricity industry for several reasons. First, the
NGC has a statutory duty to develop and maintain a reliable, efficient, and economic transmission system, as well as to promote competition in supply and generation. 65 Moreover, the NGC is responsible for environmental preservation as it relates to the regulation of
plant emissions. These statutory obligations are well-aligned with
the requirements set forth in Chapter IV of the Electricity Directive
relating to the establishment of a transmission system operator and
its duties. 67

161. See id. (noting power is traded in the United Kingdom by the energy commodity market called the Pool).
162. See Brower et al., supra note 140 (noting the formation of the National
Grid Company ("NGC") when English and Welsh electricity systems were privatized).
163. The UK Electricit, System, supra note 135.
164. See id. (noting the original and current ownership structure of the NGC).
But see infra text accompanying note 204 (emphasizing that the RECs continue to
be major shareholders of the NGC).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, arts. 7-9, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 2425 (setting forth responsibilities and duties of a transmission system operator); see
also supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discussing further responsibilities
of the transmission system operator under the Electricity Directive).
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When England and Wales established the NGC as the transmission
system operator, its independence of generation and supply activities
was mandated. 6 6 This requirement complies nicely with the Electricity Directive's mandate set forth in Article 7, which states that the
system operator must be independent-at least in terms of management-from activities unrelated to transmission. "9 Further, the independence requirement contributes to the unbundling portions of the
Electricity Directive in Articles 13 through 15, which state that
should the same entity carry out transmission, distribution, and generation, there must be separate accounts for each function. 70
The NGC's primary purpose is to provide open, nondiscriminatory
access to the transmission grid system in England and Wales.' In
order to do this, the transmission system operator has three major responsibilities. First, it must define the technical requirements necessary for connection and ensure that those requirements are nondiscriminatory.17 This responsibility complies with Article 7 of the
Electricity Directive, which requires the Member States to ensure
that minimal technical guidelines exist for connections.' 7 1 In England
and Wales, the government delegated this responsibility to the inde-

168. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (noting that requiring independence of the transmission system operator did not necessarily have to occur
within the structure of a privatized electricity system).
169. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 7, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24 (requiring the system operator to remain independent from non-transmission activities, specifically management activities).
170. See id. arts. 13-15, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 25-26 (discussing requirements of
unbundling and transparency of accounts); see also supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing how vertically and horizontally integrated undertakings must utilize unbundling principles, at least in their internal accounting systems).
171. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (addressing NGC's responsibilities in operating the transmission grid system).
172. See id. (listing examples of technical requirements, such as quick nondiscriminatory response to connection requests, that the NGC requires the transmission system operator to consider).
173. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 7, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24
(setting forth the Member State's obligation to ensure baseline standards for technical design are established in order to promote interoperability among the Member States).
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pendent system operator.' 4 Second, the NGC is given three-months
in which to respond to requests for connection to the transmission
system.17 ' This duty complies with the mandate of Article 8 of the
Electricity Directive, which states that the transmission system operator has the responsibility of determining the dispatch of generating installations and use of interconnections within its area.'' Finally,
NGC is required to produce a Seven Year Statement, which analyzes
information compiled from its years of operation and projects future
structure and usage of the system to assist customers in making prudent investment decisions.177 This reporting requirement parallels one
of the main purposes of the Electricity Directive, which is making information public and accessible.' 7'
The NGC splits its charges" 9 for the use of the system by generators and suppliers into two elements, namely, connection'" and use)"
These charges are published 112 and regulated.' Publishing the
174. See supra text accompanying note 172 (discussing England's delegation of
responsibility for ensuring baseline technical requirements exist to the transmission
system operator).
175. See id. (noting the obligation of the NGC to expeditiously respond to connection requests).
176. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 8,1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24-25
(noting the transmission system operator's duty to determine use of interconnections and dispatch of generating installations); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the transmission system operator's obligation to make
such determinations in a nondiscriminatory manner).
177. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (establishing the requirement for NGC to produce a report used to enhance investment decisions).
178. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 8, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 24-25
(discussing the transmission system operator's requirement of publishing criteria
for the use of interconnectors); see also supra text accompanying note 102 (discussing the necessity for the transmission system operator's impartiality in conducting its business).
179. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (computing ditTerent
charges throughout England's fourteen zones for transmission system use and connection based on costs associated with connection relative to the location of the
demand).
180. See id. (levying connection charge on any user directly connected to the
system, and basing the charge on the net asset value of the user's connection).
181. See id. (levying a use charge on suppliers and generators connected to and
using the transmission grid system).
182. See id. (publishing charges to ensure cost awareness and nondiscriminatory
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charges to promote nondiscriminatory behavior and transparency of
charges'84 conforms to the Electricity Directive's mandates for such
behaviors described in Articles 7 and 8, respectively.'85 At 10:00 a.m.
every morning, the NGC is responsible for determining scheduling
and subsequent dispatch in a process based on "day-ahead bid
price."'' 6 From this price, the NGC formulates a scheduling plan,
which accounts for all actions necessary to ensure the reliable operation of the grid, and formulates an idea of which power stations will
be required to produce electricity the next day.'87
E.

DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY IN PRIVATIZED

ENGLAND AND

WALES

The distribution'88 and supply responsibilities of the English and
Welsh privatized electricity systems were delegated to the twelve
cost allocation).

183. See id. (regulating the transmission system in England and Wales based on
an RPI minus X equation, whereby RPI equals the retail price index and X, the efficiency variable, equaled three percent until 1997). In 1997, England required an
initial cost reduction of 20%, followed by RPI minus 4% for each subsequent year
through 2001. See id. (discussing the pricing formula for transmission use and
connection).

184. See id. (illustrating that transparency of charges allows customers to ascertain where the charges are derived, providing a downward pressure on prices).
Further, this practice has resulted in increased awareness of customer's needs by
companies. See id. (evidencing this heightened corporate awareness by recent innovations in the electricity market).
185. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, arts. 7-8, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 2425 (requiring the transmission system operator to use nondiscriminatory behavior
in its dealings and publish criteria used in determining interconnection and use).
186. The UK Electricity System, supra note 135. The day-ahead bid price for
generating units is a complex pricing structure that accounts for forecasted demand
to establish the Pool purchase price. See id. (examining NGC's price setting
mechanism). This system creates an atypical commodity market because the commodity, electricity, is incapable of being stored. See id. (discussing the reasons the
electricity market is unique).
187. See id. (stating NGC's scheduling task encompasses accounting for factors
such as reserve requirements and voltage control).
188. See id. (providing that a distribution network monitors and operates assets
that transport power from grid supply points to the ultimate user of that power over
low-voltage lines or underground cables). The voltage of these lines ranges from
three volts to 132,000 volts. See id. (distinguishing lower voltage distribution lines
from transmission lines carrying high voltage).
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RECs.8 9 Like the transmission system, the distribution system is susceptible to noncompetitive monopoly behavior due to the limited
number of lines; thus, distribution system charges are likewise regulated.' 9 The English and Welsh electricity supply systems are structured2 so that a company must hold a supply license'"' to sell electric9
ity.

189. See id. (identifying the entities responsible for the distribution and supply
of electricity to 22 million customers in England and Wales). RECs ensure competition by providing open access to their systems in a non-discriminatory manner.
See id. (obligating nondiscriminatory open access on the part of the RECs). This
obligation conforms to the mandates of the Electricity Directive of the European
Union in Articles 10 and 11 which mandate nondiscriminatory open access. See
Electricity Directive, supra note 14, arts. 10-11, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 25 (ensuring
equal treatment of customers utilizing the relevant distribution network).
190. See The UKElectricin'Systenz, supra note 135 (noting similar monopolistic
structure of distribution and transmission systems). Distribution system charges,
like transmission system charges, are regulated by the RPI minus X formula. See
id. (noting distribution charges are established by the same RPI minus X formula
that establishes transmission system charges); cf supra note 183 (discussing RPI
minus X formula as applied in the transmission context). The regulator, applying
the RPI minus X formula, proposed that distribution charges should be reduced
between 11% and 17% on April 1, 1995, depending on the REC, with a 2% reduction each of the following years. See The UK Electriciy System, supra note 135
(formulating reduction proposals from 1995 through 1999 to reduce overall charge
of distribution).
191. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (recognizing the names of
these type of licenses are the "Public Electricity Supply" license and the "second
tier" license). The Public Electricity Supply license allows RECs holding such a
license certain rights and obligations to sell electricity within its designated service
area. See id. This license is equipped with price controls instituted by the regulator
since RECs currently serve a captive (monopoly) market. See Brower et al., supra
note 140 (establishing that the license is regulated similar to the distribution system's RPI minus X formula, differing in that the regulated charges include only
those specific to the supply of electricity, such as added costs and margins, that
cannot be passed through to other functions like purchase, transmission, or distribution). The second tier license was implemented to create competition, allowing
the RECs to obtain this license to supply electricity to customers with larger requirements. See The UK Electricity S'stemn, supra note 135 (providing RECs the
ability to sell electricity to larger customers outside of their territory, and finding
that 43% of those customers purchase electricity from a supplier not designated as
their REC). In 1998, this competitive market became available to all supply customers. See Brower et al., supra note 140 (indicating that the REC franchises are
scheduled to be removed in 1998 allowing all customers to select their own suppliers).
192. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (providing the requirements
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The Director General for Electricity Supply ("Director General")
issues the pricing and licensing controls.'93 The government appoints
the Director General, who is responsible for enforcing the principles
of the open electricity market. 94 Currently, under the REC captive
market regime, the RECs and the Director General have jointly developed codes of practice that govern the manner in which business
is conducted with franchise customers.'9' This practice fulfills the
mandates of Article 22 of the Electricity Directive, which requires
Member States to create devices for regulation to protect customers. 9 6 To date, the Director General has approved two types of performance standards:'9 7 Guaranteed Standards "8 and Overall Standards. '99
F. REVIEWING THE SUCCESS OF ENGLISH AND WELSH
PRIVATIZATION

Although some have hailed the privatization of the electricity industry in England and Wales successful, because prices of electricity
in England have declined approximately two percent since the implementation of privatization, 2°° there have been three notable critifor holding a license to sell electricity in England and Wales).
193. See Brower et al., supra note 140 (observing the Director General for Electricity Supply ("Director General") was charged with making regulatory decisions
with the guidance of the Office of Electricity Regulation).
194. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (reporting the Director General's responsibility for ensuring and protecting the development of competition
and the protection of customers).
195. See id. (illustrating areas covered by the codes of practices to enhance customer service including items such as energy efficiency, complaint procedures, and
services for disabled or elderly customers).
196. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 22, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 28
(requiring Member States to establish a regulatory regime to protect customers
from anti-competitive behavior).
197. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (referring to the customer
service standards set forth by the RECs and agreed upon by the regulator).
198. See id. (describing "Guaranteed Standards" as required service levels that,
if not met, mandate payment by the company to the customer).
199. See id. (defining "Overall Standards" as the minimal level of functions a
customer has a right to expect but the company is not required to guarantee).
200. See The UK Electricity System, supra note 135 (noting electricity price decrease since privatization, not accounting for inflation).
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cisms. 2 ' A noteworthy concern, however, is that corporate profits
have increased in conjunction with electricity price reductions. 2 Financial data from generation, transmission, and distribution companies show that shareholders, rather than consumers, received most of
the benefits of these companies' cost savings due to privatization.,"
This is especially troublesome since the NGC's major shareholders
are the RECs, thereby creating dividend profit from NGC investment
in addition to higher bottom-line profits for the RECs.2'
A second concern is that the Pool does not appear to operate as
intended. 2 5 The Pool prices have been volatile, which is not in itself
problematic; however, the Pool prices have not accurately reflected
the marginal cost of producing the power. : ' This problem was identified by Frank Wolak, a professor of economics at Stanford University, as "a natural outcome of the political give-and-take that inevitably accompanies a switch from a monopolistic market structure to a

201. See Frank Wolak, Electricity DeregulationDoesn't Mean Lois Prices, ENN
DAILY NEWS (January 24, 1997) <http://w'ww.enn.com/enn-news-archive/ 1997/

01/012497/01249703.asp> (asserting that the English and Welsh privatized systems contain market flaws). But see Michael Tebo, Study Shows Energ, Deregulation is Lowering Costs, ENN DAILY NEWS (May 15, 1997) <http://www.enn.news/
enn-news-archive/1997/05/051597/05159706.asp> (asserting that competition in
energy has resulted in lower prices to consumers). The success of an initiative such
as privatization is typically measured by examining whether the initiative made the
relevant economy more efficient, created competition, and reduced prices to the
consumer. See Brower et al., supra note 140 (remarking on the various tests examined to determine the success of industry restructuring).
202. See Brower et al., supra note 140 (observing that the increase in corporate
profits illustrates concerns that the financial benefits attained from privatization are
not being passed on equitably to the consumers).
203. See id. (detailing that company shareholders are reaping the benefits of
higher profits due to lower costs instead of passing them on to consumers).
204. See id. (emphasizing the RECs as shareholders of the NGC).
205. See id. (summarizing that the Pool was intended to create a market whereby
past Pool prices provide a point of reference for new pricing, and variations in
prices from day-to-day signal customers as to the timing and quantity of electricity
purchased).
206. See id. (noting that Pool prices, thus far, are determinative only of National
Power and PowerGen costs, not the entire competitive market, therefore, these two
companies appear to have market dominance and the market is not truly competitive).
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so-called 'competitive' one. ' ' Professor Wolak suggests that in order to rectify this problem, regulators must play a role in designing
and managing the new, competitive market.
Finally, with the removal of the REC structure in distribution,
there is significant concern about mergers. 09 The government's right
to veto REC mergers and REC ownership expired in March 1995.210
The purchase of the RECs by the larger electricity companies, such
as National Power and PowerGen, led to three problems. First, mergers and takeovers reduce the number of competitors from which consumers
• 211can choose, thereby lessening competition among the cornpanies.
Second, decreased competition resulting from the
reintegration of these transmission, distribution, and generation companies to their pre-privatization structure may lead to anticompetitive practices such as self-dealing and price-fixing."' Third,
horizontal integration, which occurs when a company merges with a
company that provides similar end products,"' can harm competition
by diluting the company's original focus in its core competence as it
expands into different types of business practices.'214

207. Wolak, supra note 201.
208. See id. (suggesting that, in the case of England and Wales, where only a
few dominant suppliers exist, regulators should require dominant companies to sell
some of their generating assets to prevent the market dominance and market price
setting abilities currently seen with National Power and PowerGen).
209. See Brower et al., supra note 140 (expressing concern that larger companies will buy smaller companies creating further market concentration).
210. See id. (expanding on concerns over the development of an anticompetitive market in the newly privatized electricity industry); see also Romaniuk, supra note 19, at 1029-32 (identifying Article 90 of the EEC Treaty as the
European Commission's tool to prevent Member States from implementing anticompetitive laws while noting the Article is only implicated if Member States enact measures violative of the EEC Treaty or other European Community treaties).
211. See Brower et al., supra note 140 (stating that the result of mergers is industry consolidation, which limits competition).
212. See id. (contending that in a deregulated industry there is a possibility of
anti-competitive behavior if transmission, distribution, and generation companies
reintegrate via merger or takeover).
213. See id. (defining horizontal integration using the example of a hydro-power
generation company purchasing a coal power generation plant).
214. See id. (discussing the threat to consumers resulting from horizontal integration).
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IV. THREE PROBLEMS OF PRIVATIZATION, AND
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Proponents of restructuring the electricity industry claim that
problems caused by deregulation will be solved by the free, competitive market mechanisms." 5 This is not necessarily so. The Commission must learn from the English and Welsh privatization initiative in order to create a more effective single market in electricity.
There are three significant problems that require special provisions
within the Electricity Directive and subsequent Member State legislation.216
A. POWER PRODUCING INDUSTRY PROTECTIONS

First, certain power-generating industries appear to require protection at the outset of deregulation to ensure that their contributions to
the electricity supply are maintained.2 7 For example, because nuclear
generating facilities are expensive to build and maintain, those plants
produce more expensive power. ' 9 In a truly competitive market,
electricity supply customers would not purchase power from these
facilities because the supplier's costs would be higher than their
competitors, thus forcing companies producing nuclear power out of
the market. 19 Moreover, if the expense of operating and maintaining

215. See Tebo, supra note 201 (maintaining that markets have vehicles, such as
hedging instruments, that allow for companies to manage price risks). Hedging instruments "allow large commercial and industrial consumers to lock in energy
prices over a period of time and free themselves from the price volatility that characterizes short-term trading." Id.
216. See 3 Hurdles Seen for Electricity Deregulation, supra note 128 (reporting
potential flaws in a deregulated electricity market).
217. See Coal Industi,: Unions Call For European Policy, EUR. ENERGY
(Europe Information Service), June 5, 1998, at No. 515 (emphasizing the need for
an European Union policy protecting the coal industry because liberalizing the energy industry creates competition for more expensive coal production, and Central
and Eastern European countries aspiring to accede into the Union are coalproducing countries).
218. See Interview with Linda Lee, Supervisory Attorney, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (July 20, 1998) (describing reasons why nuclear power is
so costly).
219. See Wasserman, supra note I (finding nuclear reactors uneconomical and
asserting natural gas, due to its low cost, would dominate a competitive electricity
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a nuclear plant forces nuclear energy generating facilities out of the
competitive market, customers would not only face the possibility of
a supply shortage but also would be forced to bear the cost of decommissioning these plants, a bill that can run into millions of U.S.
dollars.22°
The Electricity Directive did not address specific types of power
supply that require protections.22 ' Instead, the Electricity Directive
left such judgments up to each Member State because of the vast differences in types of power generation among the Member States."
Due to the potential economic and financial implications discussed
above, the protection of nuclear power-although contrary to a truly
competitive market-is an important inclusion in Electricity Directive provisions.223
B. PROTECTIONS AGAINST MARKET DOMINANCE

The second obstacle to overcome in a deregulated electricity industry is that large companies, such as those in England and Wales, 24
have the potential to manipulate prices, thereby creating a barrier to
market entry for smaller firms.225 The Electricity Directive attempts
market).
220. See Interview with Linda Lee, supra note 218 (discussing financial implications to consumers of abandoning currently operating nuclear facilities). See,
e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 28 F.E.R.C. para. 61,213 (1984) (illustrating the controversial nature of when and who should absorb a multi-million dollar
decommissioning bill when a nuclear power generation plant is shut down).
221. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 5, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 23
(stating that protection of specific power producing industries is not part of the
Electricity Directive).
222. See, e.g., Energy Council: Gas Liberalisationand the Environment Dominate May 11 Session, EUR. ENERGY (Europe Information Service), May 20, 1998,
at No. 514 (commenting that Denmark currently produces 9% of its energy requirements from renewable resources, primarily by windmills).
223. Cf Wasserman, supra note 1 (remarking that in anticipation of deregulation, utility lobbyists in the United States are demanding up to 40% in surcharges
from their consumers in order to pay for the reactors in case no special provisions
protecting nuclear utilities are developed).
224. See supra text accompanying note 161 (inferring that, since privatization,
Pool prices in England and Wales reflect prices set by the two largest companies,
National Power and PowerGen, instead of the market).
225. See 3 Hurdles Seen for Electricity Deregulation,supra note 128 (outlining
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to overcome this issue by requiring price transparency so that customers know where their charges are coming from. "' Merely requiring price transparency and further relying on Article 90 of the EEC
Treaty2" to enforce it is inadequate. " The same type of law with
which England created franchise territories for the RECs must further ensure that there are enough firms competing in the market. ' ' ,
By ensuring that the market is fertile for new entrants, no firms will
be left to dominate the Pool that is charged with setting prices for
electricity in England and Wales. 2"
C. PROTECTION AGAINST DEGRADING THE ENVIRONMENT

Finally, deregulation may potentially contribute to the degradation
of the environment. 3 ' For example, older coal plants, emitting a variety of greenhouse gases, are inexpensive to operate; thus, power
coming from such plants is cheaper than generating power from new
plants. 2 In a May 1998 meeting of the European Energy Council,
problem of price manipulation thereby precluding entry of competition).
226. See Electricity Directive, supra note 14, arts. 4-6, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 2324 (delineating the necessity for transparent prices).
227. See EEC TREATY, supra note 27, art. 90 ("Undertakings entrusted with the
operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a
revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty,
in particular to the rules on competition, insofar as the application of such rules
does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned
to them.").
228. See Romaniuk, supra note 19, at 1025-26 (noting that the Commission often relies on Article 90, which protects against anti-competitive behavior, when
legislation, such as the Electricity Directive, does not provide its own mechanism
for Commission intervention against market abuses).
229. See 3 Hurdles Seen for Electricin' Deregulation, supra note 128 (recommending legislation that contains safeguards against monopolization of the market
by a few large firms).
230. See Brower et al., supra note 140 (identifying that, currently, 85% of the
time, the Pool price in England and Wales is determined by plants owned by National Power or PowerGen).
231. See id. (contending that the environment may suffer as a result of electricity
deregulation).
232. See id. (commenting that the greenhouse gases emitted from energyproducing coal plants are detrimental to the environment, but that nevertheless,
burning coal remains a widely used process of energy production due to its cost
efficiency).
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environmental protection issues dominated the discussion. " John
Battle, the United Kingdom Minister for Science, Energy and Industry, and Michael Meacher, the United Kingdom's Environment Minister, stressed the importance of increasing the use of renewable energy sources to ensure adequate energy supply without harming the
environment through greenhouse gas emissions. 234
The Electricity Directive merely mentions the need for Member
States to consider environmental issues in implementing its mandates. 2 " Both the Commission and the Council to the European Parliament are making efforts to protect against an environmental "race
to the bottom. '23 6 Neither the Commission nor the Council for the
European Parliament has opined on the structure or details of the
Framework Programme.237 The Framework Programme combines all
existing programs, such as Altener II,238 under one energy policy and
further supports the main objectives of security of supply, competition, and the environment.239
If the Framework Programme were adopted, it would certainly aid
in solving the problem of environmental degradation due to opening
up competition in the energy industry. The adoption of such a comprehensive program is unlikely, however, as budgets for environmental programs are continually being cut 240 and several Member

233. See Energy Council: Gas Liberalisation and the Environment Dominate
May 11 Session, supra note 222 (deciding that the environmental and energy policy are "inextricably linked").
234. See id. (recognizing the necessity of cooperation between energy and environmental policy).
235. See, e.g., Electricity Directive, supra note 14, art. 5, 1997 O.J. (L 027) at 23
(proposing environmental protection as a criterion Member States should consider
when deciding to approve construction of new generating facilities).
236. See Energy Council: Gas Liberalisation and the Environment Dominate
May 11 Session, supra note 222 (noting that the European Union's Ministers for
Science, Energy and Industry adopted a Resolution regarding the Commission's
November 1997 White Paper on renewable energy, agreeing that a 12% target for
the European Union's use of renewable energy sources by 2010 is a tenable goal).
237. See id. (observing the status of ajoint energy/environmental policy).
238. See id. (describing Altener II as a program promoting the use of renewable
energy sources).
239. See id. (discussing the function of the Framework Programme).
240. See id. (specifying that Altener II's budget was cut over 25%).
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States relying on "dirty" power production industries, such as coal,
would face severe economic harm under strict environmental guidelines. 24' The better solution is to simply incorporate more stringent
environmental guidelines into the text of the Electricity Directive.

CONCLUSION
Each of the three problems addressed in this Comment is solved
not by the workings of a true free market driven by competition but
through specific provisions in European Union law. The Commission
faces significant challenges in adopting adequate Resolutions to resolve these issues. Solutions for some of the problems seem to conflict with solutions for others, notably protection of industries and
protection of the environment. Underlying everything, the Commission must find solutions agreeable to all Member States, each with
distinct economic and political agendas.

241. See id. (asserting the reluctance of the Commission and the Council to the
European Parliament to implement the Framework Program); see also Coal Industry: Unions Call for European Policy, supra note 13 (noting that the potential accession of Central and Eastern European coal-producing countries will increase the
importance of the coal industry).

